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Becoming delinquent in the post-war welfare state: England and Wales, 1945-1965 
Introduction 
Before the Second World War, the majority view of academics and practitioners in the field 
of juvenile justice in the UK and the US was that youthful delinquency was caused by 
deprivation, be that in economic, physical or emotional terms.1  These deprivations were 
ultimately caused by the processes of Western modernity, namely the inequalities of 
capitalism, the drive to acquire material goods and the disruption of traditional family 
structures and social mores.  The solution to this was not to physically chastise the young or 
to incarcerate them, but rather to prevent future bad behaviour by addressing the problems 
that caused it.   
The first juvenile court, set up in 1899 in Cook County, Chicago, established a 
specialist holistic model for this.2  This concept of a juvenile court was found resonance in 
other parts of the world, including England and Wales.3  The first juvenile court was set up in 
Birmingham in 1905, and a national system for England and Wales was formally introduced 
by the Children Act 1908.4  Through such tools as gathering pre-hearing reports from 
schoolteachers and social workers and the use of probation orders, the juvenile courts aimed 
to prevent as well as punish.5  The Children and Young Persons Act 1933 added further 
requirements in terms of the layout of the juvenile courts, banning the naming of those 
                                                                 
1 H. Hendrick (1994) Child Welfare: England 1872 - 1989  (London: Routledge), pp.9-11. 
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attending court in the press, and adjusting the upper age limit from 16 to 17 years old.6  The 
Cadogan Report of 1938 recommended the cessation of corporal punishment, and birching as 
a penalty for juvenile males was abolished as part of the Criminal Justice Act 1948.7  The 
Ingleby Report of 1958 called for the decriminalisation of juvenile offenders, with 
rehabilitative measures instead.  This report – along with others undertaken in the 1950s and 
1960s – formed the backdrop for the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, which intended 
to do this before being scaled back by the incoming Conservative government of 1970.  
These developments in the realm of juvenile justice also need to be seen in the movement for 
children’s rights in the later nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, as manifested in the 
establishment of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in 1884, the 
expansion of compulsory elementary education, the regularisation of fostering and adoption, 
restrictions on juvenile smoking and drinking, school meals and medical inspections, and the 
growth of the Child Study Movement.8  
David Garland described this approach as ‘penal welfarist’. The penal welfare state 
was a modernist superstructure supported by a cross-party political consensus, combining 
punishment with expert rehabilitation in order to achieve its ends.9  The penal welfare state 
required ‘experts’ to shape its advice, to tailor it to the precisely-defined needs of individual 
young people, and in doing so created an army of specialists to deal with them.10 However, 
the experts tended to focus their efforts on the most deprived/depraved cases, whilst the 
majority were dealt with summarily through the use of fines.11  This was part of the middle 
class grip on society as a whole and the growth of professional society in particular.12 For 
Garland, this penal welfare state was disrupted by the financial crises and subsequent 
rethinking of the efficacy of welfare that took place in the 1970s, ushering in a far more 
                                                                 
6 See M. Fry and C. B. Russell (1950) A Note Book for the Children's Court  (London: Howard League for 
Penal Reform), J. Watson and P. Watson (1973) The Modern Juvenile Court.  (London: Shaw and Sons) p.3. 
7 I. Gibson (1978) The English Vice: Beating, Sex and Shame in Victorian England and After   (London: 
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8 See G. Behlmer (1998) Friends of the Family: the English Home and its Guardians (Stanford: Stanford 
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9 D. Garland (2002) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society   (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press), pp.27-8. 
10 Garland, Culture of Control, p.36. 
11 Garland, Culture of Control, p.42. 
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punitive paradigm,13 which John Pratt has termed ‘penal populist’. The penal populist 
approach is driven by a public desire to see offenders punished, does not seek to understand 
the circumstances of the offending behaviour, to rehabilitate or to address structural 
inequalities, but rather seeks retribution through incarceration.14  Garland’s analysis, which in 
turn draws upon the work of Foucault, Donzelot and Habermas in terms of the creation of a 
middle class, professional public sphere engaged with measuring and advising on the needs 
of the poor and powerless, paints a very broad brush picture of developments in the British 
welfare state and attitudes towards crime and punishment.15  Garland’s chronology is 
problematic because it is an historical account that is not grounded in rigorous archival work, 
and thus is not rooted in the contours of social change in post-war Britain.  Whilst Garland’s 
account is engaging and convincing on one level, it paints too broad a brush stroke over the 
historical narrative, similar to the one Selina Todd has noted in terms of perceptions of the 
affluence in post-war Britain and the ‘rediscovery of poverty’ in the 1960s.16  Although there 
are many historical treatments of the policy development of the welfare state, historians have 
only recently begun to look systematically at the social history of welfare in post-war Britain, 
and thus it is imperative that broad sweep perceptions are revisited and revised in the light of 
fresh historical understandings.17    
Through its consideration of the ways in which juvenile delinquency was seen to exist 
within the welfare state, this chapter offers a different account to that of Garland.  As this 
chapter will argue, a broad brush account overlooks some of the critical forces of change, and 
overstates the impact of welfare on the ground and the decline of punitive voices in public 
                                                                 
13 Garland, Culture of Control. 
14 J. Pratt (2007) Penal Populism  (Abingdon: Routledge). 
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(1989) The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of the Medical Profession  (London: Routledge); J. Habermas 
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discourse before the 1970s.  Whilst Nilsson has found Garland’s theory to be a satisfactory 
framework in terms of the Swedish situation,18 it is not as useful as a starting point in terms 
of analysing the case of England and Wales. Whilst there were agencies and institutions that 
did fit Garland’s portrayal of a penal welfare state, and the original Children and Young 
Persons Act 1969 would have been its execution par excellence, the process was far more 
complex and contested.  This chapter will explore the explanations given for delinquency and 
remedies for it as manifested in political discourse, the shifting location of expertise in 
juvenile delinquency and welfare, before looking at the Ingleby Report itself, and asking how 
these fit in with Garland’s analysis. 
 
The postwar paradox: rising affluence, rising juvenile crime 
Where the ‘penal welfarist’ explanation of juvenile delinquency as the product of deprivation 
of one sort or another came adrift was in the decades immediately after the Second World 
War, when deprivation had supposedly been tackled by the provisions of the welfare state.  
The Labour governments of 1945-51 introduced a welfare state that provided a financial 
safety net for those out of work, the National Health Service provided a healthcare 
programme that was free at the point of access, secondary education to age fifteen and 
beyond was available to all, and there were major programmes of public and private house 
building.  Over the course of this period, work was plentiful, and employees had more 
disposable income in their pockets than before.  Working class teenagers in particular were 
seen as being particularly affluent, an assumption fuelled by Mark Abrams’ market research 
in the later 1950s.19  Yet the police and the Home Office noted steady increases in crime and 
its severity by all age groups, which followed the outbreak of war in 1939 and failed to abate 
in peacetime.20  On the face of it, children and young people had more than they had ever had 
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before, yet adults were puzzled by the persistence of bad behaviour.21  This prompted a raft of 
research and policy reviews to try and find a solution to the ‘problem’ of juvenile 
delinquency within the welfare state.  Behind these concerns lay further anxieties about 
whether youthful offending might indicate more worrying shifts in the nature of British life: 
had the economic forces of modernity and capitalism changed Britons’ morality, character 
and social identity to the point where these could not be rescued by affluence and the safety 
net of the welfare state? T.R. Fyvel, the author of The Insecure Offenders, a book written in 
response to fears about the emergence of the ‘Teddy boy’, expressed this sense that there 
was: 
Something afoot, that there were some aspects of our materialistic, mechanized, 
twentieth-century society – something in the way of life, in the break-up of traditional 
authority, in the value of the headlines which encouraged widespread youthful 
cynicism in general and rather violent delinquency in particular.22 
Contemporaries by no means saw this as an exclusively English or British problem, but one 
that was experienced across the world, in both East and West, throughout the British Empire, 
spreading along with American products.  Juvenile delinquency was, on the one hand, a 
product of Western modernity and capitalism; it was also a signal of the decline of Britain’s 
imperial power and the rise of the US in cultural, economic and geopolitical terms. British 
power had been diminished by the costs of participation in two world wars, enabling the US 
to take over Britain’s previous role as the policeman and banker of the world.  Although the 
US and Britain had a shared cultural heritage and language, much was made of the US being 
‘foreign’, ‘different’ and, above all, ‘American’. Despite the global reach of the problem, it 
was one for which the roots could be found in the most intimate location: parenting practices 
and family structures within the home, which appeared to be evolving  as a result of 
modernisation and then changing rapidly in the wake of the Second World War.23    
Juvenile delinquency regularly occupied members of the Houses of Commons and the 
Lords.  Members of the House of Commons, the directly elected part of the British 
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parliament, were in part responding to the comments, questions and anxieties of their 
constituents, as well as to their own perception of media coverage and the picture presented 
through the annual releases of criminal statistics.  The newspapers were rarely slow to latch 
onto tales of garrotters or battling Mods and Rockers, as the work of Pearson and Cohen has 
shown.24 The use of statistics as a means of understanding complex social phenomena had 
grown from the mid-nineteenth century, intensifying in the mid-twentieth.25  Crime statistics 
were very much a part of this world, with the first issue of criminal statistics published in 
1857.26   New possibilities in the field of computing from the mid-twentieth century onward 
enabled more complex statistical calculations to be carried out.27 Criminal statistics also 
became news items in their own right.  As with the stereotypical representations of the 
‘juvenile delinquent’, criminal statistics offered a means of trying to grasp the concrete by 
means of the abstract.28  As members of both Houses were involved in drafting and ratifying 
laws, their perceptions of juvenile crime, its explanations and remedies were important.  
This chapter will now explore some of the concerns of the MPs and Lords regarding 
juvenile delinquency.  One set of concerns revolved around the nature of cultural products 
and their consumption by the young.  In 1946, Cyril Dumpleton, Labour MP for St. Albans, 
asked James Chuter Ede, the Home Secretary, if an enquiry would be held into the impact of 
cinema clubs on the young. Tom Skeffington-Lodge, Labour MP for Bedford, argued that the 
young were being exposed ‘to propaganda of a most undesirable sort’ during the films, whilst 
Dumpleton was concerned about the nature of the organisers.  Chuter Ede was dismissive, 
being of the mind that ‘penny dreadfuls’ had not hindered his own development and that the 
government could not usefully intervene in the matter of who would run weekend cinema 
clubs.29  Dumpleton made his point with reference the concerns of teachers and other 
                                                                 
24 G. Pearson (1983), Hooligan: a history of respectable fears  (London: Macmillan); S. Cohen (1973) Folk 
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25 T. Crook and G. O'Hara (eds.) (2011) Statistics and the Public Sphere: Numbers and the People in Modern 
Britain, c.1800-2000 (Abingdon: Routledge), pp.9-11. 
26 Hood and Roddam, ‘Crime, sentencing and punishment’, p.675. 
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professionals, speaking on another occasion of a headmistress in his constituency studied 
these cinema clubs, finding that the children were encouraged to passively consume the films 
shown.30 Another head drew attention to the club leaders’ lack of training and alleged 
recourse to films that would gratify and placate.31  The headteachers presented their particular 
impressions the cinema clubs, with no attempt to measure or ascertain what the children and 
young people had actually made of it.  The voices of the young were absent.  What such 
debates raised were the conflicts of interest between teachers who wanted to see ‘educational’ 
fare being provided and the film and cinema industries, who wanted to offer products that 
sold.  
Concerns were also raised about the specific content of these products and their 
impact on the moral outlook of children, young people and other vulnerable groups.  
Skeffington-Lodge started a debate in the Commons in 1947 on the practice of British 
magazine and newspaper proprietors in buying in ‘American’ fiction for publication.  He 
stated that these sensational stories, full of drama, crime and divorce, were quickly adapted to 
suit a British audience, with his example of ‘St James’ Park’ being substituted for ‘Central 
Park’ in the New York-based original.  He argued that: 
Their readers are unconsciously absorbing propaganda for the American way of life. I 
have no objection to the American way of life for Americans, but let them keep it, I 
suggest, in America.32 
Such views were not typical of all members, and were rebutted accordingly – in this case, 
MPs spoke about Britain’s own lack of moral leadership in not acting to bring rates of 
illegitimacy down in Barbados, as well as the way in which Britons were not compelled to 
buy or read such material, and the trade agreements required through Britain’s participation 
in the Marshall Plan, the major economic recovery scheme underwritten by the US in the 
later 1940s and 1950s to rebuild European economies and thereby prevent the spread of 
communism.33  
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Such concerns persisted.  In 1952, Maurice Edelman, Labour MP for Coventry and a 
writer himself, raised a question in the Commons about the American-style comics.  Edelman 
claimed that the comics had been brought into the UK by American troops during the war, 
but had subsequently found willing publishers and an eager market He argued that the comics 
were ‘sadistic’, and that they ‘introduce[d] the element of pleasure into violence.’  Whilst 
Edelman could not prove a linkage between these comics and youth crime, he argued that this 
was due to a lack of enquiry.34 The comics were not a part of a gradual embracing of the 
‘American’: their arrival in the UK was a result of the war itself.  In the same debate, Dr 
Horace King, pointed to the way in which children supposedly took things on trust from 
adults, and that in a world of ‘crazy and cheap values’ the state had a duty to intervene to 
protect the young from such deleterious influences.35  He said: 
We want to keep our English ways. What we get from America is not the best of 
American life, the natural American culture that exists in a million homes in that 
country, but all that is worst from America both in scenes portrayed in the films and 
in this particularly cheap and nasty literature which is coming over.36 
Although ‘America’ was the label attached to these cultural products, the meaning was far 
from literal.  What the MPs were referring to was commercialised, popular texts that were 
easy to access and digest, which were associated with ‘American’ consumer culture.  The 
‘harm’ side of this resulted in a campaign to ban the comics, which, as Martin Barker has 
shown, produced the Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications) Act 1955, which 
banned such publications.37  The ‘American’ side of the debate continued.  
Concerns about ‘Americanization’ were one part of a cluster of anxieties that were 
periodically expressed by MPs in relation to the impact of the Second World War.  Whilst 
there were many parallels between juvenile delinquency in the First and Second World Wars, 
the latter had some significant differences, notably around the presence of overseas troops 
and prisoners of war and the level of domestic disruption and devastation.  As some of the 
extracts above suggest, some saw the presence of GIs in Britain during the conflict as being 
the means by which ‘American’ products were brought into the country and tastes 
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established.  The American cultural products were not just affordable and accessible, but 
spoke to an allegedly different system of values around consumption, self-gratification and a 
lack of regard for others.  This explanation of juvenile delinquency set up a number of binary 
oppositions, which placed an immoral, throwaway ‘American’ culture of serial divorces and 
gangsters against a moral, durable British culture.  Skeffington-Lodge’s central concern about 
the US fiction being ‘Anglicized’ was the ‘roaring carnival of quick drinks, adolescent sex, 
bright lights and dimmed thinking’, its location within an affluent backdrop, and the casual 
treatment of marriage and family life being presented as taking place within Britain, and he 
worried about how this would be received within Britain and the British Empire, as 
constituting the ‘British’ way of life.38  This theme would emerge in other manifestations, as 
part of discourse around the decline of the moral fabric of the British family and of the 
British nation, in the broader context of Britain’s decline as an international power.  Divorce 
was a case in point.  Increasing rates of divorce through the early and mid-twentieth century 
were seen by some members of the Commons and Lords as being a decline in moral 
standards,39 not a reflection of how the law around divorce had been liberalised in tandem 
with growing legal aid provision for divorce.40  In objective terms, divorces were easier to 
obtain by the 1950s but there was no effective baseline for measuring how marital discord 
itself had changed.  Parenting remained a common theme, with attention being paid to how 
the war had taken fathers into the forces, and mothers into the factories, with daughters being 
tempted by troops.41 Deficient parenting in turn formed part of wider concerns about the 
impact of adults, be that adults who ran cinema clubs, those who neglected their children, or 
many others.   
As juvenile delinquency was not seen by British politicians as an exclusively British 
phenomenon, they were interested in juvenile delinquency around the world.42  This interest 
                                                                 
38 Hansard HC vol. 444 col. 2359 (28 November 1947) 
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took two specific forms.  The first was a more comparative mood, in which politicians 
contrasted the behaviour of British youth and their parents with the perceived behaviour of 
the youth behind in Communist countries.  If the US was described in terms of being a locus 
of moral turpitude, then the USSR was frequently referred to as a place in which children and 
young people were well-behaved, and where morals were far more rigorous than those of the 
United Kingdom: modernity and capitalism were to blame for youth crime.  Pro-Soviet 
attitudes in the postwar period were complex.  The Labour Party had an antipathetic 
relationship with the Communist Party of Great Britain, being opposed to any groups which 
sought to use revolutionary rather than parliamentary means of achieving socialism,43 whilst 
the opposition of the Conservative Party was self-evident.  On the other hand, the USSR had 
become a much-needed ally during the Second World War, if relations soured early on in 
peacetime.  In the Commons, Willie Gallacher, Communist MP for West Fife, waggishly told 
the House that the major Home Office-convened 1949 conference on juvenile delinquency 
should be aware that ‘if they can get these young people interested in Communism they will 
keep them away from crime?’44  Some ten years later, the Earl of Craven spoke of the horror 
of Communists at what he described as the pornographic qualities of the British press.45 
Some, like Kenneth Lindsay, saw Communist societies as having an in-built system of 
morality, in comparison with their Western, democratic counterparts:46 a belief that was 
certainly more possible in the immediate aftermath of the war, before the Hungarian uprising.  
The idea that Communism had ‘values’ was in sharp contrast to the portrayal of Britain as a 
nation in which – in England, at least – ‘morals’ were in decline, an idea put forward by the 
Bishops in the House of Lords in response to the rising crime figures.  As with the anxieties 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
and non-Western – with the launch of its Howard Journal in 1921.  Additional impetus to the reform of juvenile 
law, particularly with regard to child welfare, came through the League of Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
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seminar, Institute of Historical Research, University of London, 26 January). However, this desire by politicians 
to look outwards also spoke to anxieties about the declining power o f the ‘British’ and the rising ‘American’ 
models to provide solutions in the postwar world.  
43 See, for example, A. Thorpe (2008) The History of the British Labour Party, (Basingstoke: Palgrave). 
44 Hansard HC vol. 461 col. 527 (10 February 1949). 
45 Hansard HL vol. 223 col. 994 (18 May 1960). 
46 Hansard HC vol. 415 .col. 829 (2 November 1945). 
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about ‘Americanization’, reality was not important.  What was important in this variety of 
discourse was the sense that an idealised ‘Britain’ was slipping away as its empire was 
dismantled.  Juvenile delinquency was one signal of this. 
The second use was more political than rhetorical.  Not all politicians in the Houses of 
Commons and Lords were interested in using international comparisons for making rhetorical 
points.  The creation of bodies like the League of Nations in the interwar period and the 
United Nations after the Second World War created new opportunities for more positive 
reflections on situations in other countries. Civil servants, politicians and academics alike 
participated in the Second United Nations Congress on Crime, held in London in 1960.  The 
Congress involved over one thousand delegates, and took its theme of juvenile delinquency in 
response to the perceived role of increased affluence, consumption and cynicism of the young 
in prompting an international rise in juvenile crime, whilst also considering the opportunities 
for new approaches afforded through the U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 
1959.47  This prompted the Daily Mirror to draw comparisons between crime rates in the US, 
Sweden and London, whilst considering the growing problem of children and young people 
forming gangs in countries in the West, making a comparison between the Bodgies and 
Widgies of Australia with rioting juveniles in West Berlin and the Teddy Boys in Britain.48 
The press often ran articles on crime and particularly youth crime in other countries – often, 
but not exclusively the US and its gangs – so crime as a global phenomenon existed in the 
public imagination.49 
Juvenile delinquency in British colonies and British West Berlin caused disquiet. In 
the case of the colonies, MPs were concerned with the variations in and efficacy of 
approaches and treatments of juvenile delinquents across the Empire.  There was a mismatch 
between attitudes and practices in the UK, and what happened in the empire, as each colony 
had its own legal system, which blended laws from the British legal systems with local 
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practices.50  Whilst it meant that there was no one overarching framework, it did allow for 
comparisons of practice within this British world.51  Although corporal punishment for young 
Britons was abolished through the Criminal Justice Act 1948, following the recommendations 
of the Cadogan Report of 1938, it persisted in the Colonies, who had separate 
administrations, even if they all came under the imperial umbrella.  In 1946, Lord Faringdon 
raised a question in the House of Lords about the excessive use of flogging in the colonies.  
Faringdon referred to Havelock Ellis’ finding that flogging brutalised the individual rather 
than deterring criminality, and spoke about how the persistence of corporal punishment led to 
the resented subjugation of the colonies.52 Yet there was little appetite for change, as 
Reginald Sorenson, the Labour MP for Leyton, persisted in raising questions on similar 
matters throughout the later 1950s, as calls for the reintroduction of corporal punishment 
returned in the wake of the Teddy Boy scare.53  With decolonization gaining pace from the 
later 1950s, there was little impetus for serious British- led reform within the colonies, 
providing no answers as to whether British rule was a brutal and subjugating or a liberating 
influence, and in turn if the end of empire was the signal of a moral decline – or a process to 
be embraced.   
 
Expertise and the juvenile delinquent  
Who provided MPs and the Lords with the statistics, information and insight into the nature 
of juvenile crime on the ground, beyond their constituents?  Until the 1950s, expertise in 
juvenile delinquency and possible solutions for it had resided with a group best described as 
‘amateur-experts’. These experts were ‘amateur’ in the sense that they lacked professional 
training in their areas of work, but were passionate about their cause and often had years of 
experience in voluntary social work: it did not mean that they were ‘amateur’ in a pejorative 
sense.  Indeed, many of them were active in developing and shaping professional 
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organisations and university-based professional training and research.54  ‘Amateur’ and 
‘professional’ were sometimes conflated in the same way as ‘women’ and ‘men’, but, as 
Anne Logan has shown, this neat mapping did not always occur in reality.55  Some of the 
male professionals had launched their careers with a period of voluntary social work in boys’ 
clubs at settlement houses.56  Many of these amateur-experts came from privileged 
backgrounds, and, whilst they had empathetic feelings for the young, they were not of the 
communities they served.  These individuals drew their authority and sense of legitimacy 
from their experience in social or pastoral work.  A different category of amateur-expert was 
the senior cleric.  Whilst the Archbishop of York and other senior clerics were professionals 
in terms of their theological roles, their commentary on juvenile delinquency arose from their 
anxieties about the disruptive impact of the Second World War on British morals, as will be 
seen.  As Ryan has noted, many of these individuals were called upon through their work or 
connections with such groups as the Howard League to join Home Office advisory groups or 
to sit on the committees of Royal Commissions.  The result was a very club-like, discreet 
form of policy making.57  It did not include, however, many of those who were actively 
involved as professionals or paraprofessionals on the ground.58  Whilst there was an interest 
in juvenile delinquency elsewhere, it did not follow that experts from other nations were 
invited to take part in these groups: expertise was ‘British’, or at least filtered through British 
eyes.  
An example of this style of policy-making was the Central Conference on Juvenile 
Delinquency of 1949, which spawned a series of local conferences.  The publication of the 
Criminal Statistics for 1947 and early figures for 1948 suggested that the apparent rise in 
                                                                 
54 Basil Henriques was chair of the National Association for Boys’ Clubs after 1925, whilst Eileen 
Younghusband, Pearl Jephcott and Josephine Macalister Brew straddled the worlds o f social work and 
academia. See S. McCabe (2004) ‘Henriques, Sir Basil Lucas Quixano (1890-1961)’in H.C.G. Matthew and B. 
Harrison (eds) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press); K. Jones (1984) 
Eileen Younghusband: A Biography  (London: Bedford Square); A. Turnbull (2004) ‘Jephcott, (Agnes) Pearl 
(1900-1980),’ in L. Goldman (ed) Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
55 A. Logan (2010) ‘Women and the Provision of Criminal Justice Advice: Lessons from England and Wales, 
1944-64’ British Journal of Criminology 50. 
56 V. Bailey (1987) Delinquency and Citizenship: Reclaiming the Young Offender, 1914 -1948  (Oxford: 
Clarendon). 
57 M. Ryan (2003) Penal Policy and Political Culture in England and Wales (Winchester: Waterside Press), 
pp.17-21. 
58 Ryan, Penal Policy, pp.22-6. 
14 
crime during the war was not abating in peacetime.  This prompted the Archbishop of York, 
Cyril Garbett, to instigate a debate on the matter in the House of Lords.59  The debate led to 
the Central Conference, jointly run by the Home Office and the Education Department and 
bringing together representatives of the faiths, charities, schools, universities, social workers, 
local government, the police, educational psychologists and the film industry in March 
1949.60 All participants came from British-based organisations. The conference concluded 
that the root of juvenile delinquency lay ultimately in the home, in women working, 
inadequate family allowances and a lack of knowledge of mother craft; it also recommended 
greater investment in play and youth services, ‘suitable’ reading material for children and 
better trained staff in Sunday Schools; it also felt that juvenile courts were too informal and 
sentimental, that too many children were ‘getting away’ with single offences.61  The 
conference was a curious mix of recommendations that could be construed as penal welfarist, 
insofar as the general consensus pointed to supporting the family and using civil society as a 
means of prevention and cure; yet these were also framed within a more conservative, anti-
modern discourse of restoring the family and the church as the points of control and 
discipline within the community.62 Whilst the conference looked to the home as the site 
where problems began for children and young people, the broader question of juvenile 
delinquency was not conceived of as a purely ‘British’ one.  The war and cultural imports 
were external forces of exacerbation, the former through disrupting the rhythms of the home 
and the latter through the supposed power of films to encourage delinquent behaviour.  ‘Bad’ 
films were not the exclusive preserve of Hollywood, if a sense of the film as a medium for 
spreading ‘American’ values remained it formed part of a more general unease about the 
potential of this relatively new form of entertainment, reflected in the Wheare Report of the 
following year.63 
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The stranglehold of the amateur-expert began to lessen in the postwar period.  This 
was directly related to the growth in scope and confidence of social science research in 
universities and within the Civil Service itself.  This ‘scientific’ approach to delineating 
social problems was reflected in the growing field of social science research which, by the 
1930s, was increasingly the preserve of university-based researchers as opposed to privately-
backed individuals such as Charles Booth or Seebohm Rowntree.64   As McClintock and 
Avison note, the Criminal Justice Act 1948 enabled the government to spend money on 
commissioning research to be undertaken by university researchers, as well as private 
individuals and organisations, before the Home Office created its own Research Unit in 1957.  
Calls for further expansion of university social science research on behalf of the government 
resulted in R.A. Butler’s proposal for an Institute of Criminology in the Penal Practice in a 
Changing Society White Paper of 1959: an organisation which would have the capacity to 
undertake a deeper testing of the relationship between modernisation and rising levels of 
juvenile delinquency.65  This was, as Ryan notes, a direct challenge to the cosy world of the 
amateur-expert networks that had previously had the ear of government and marked a shift 
towards the use of professional research in developing policy.66   
In tandem with this, the demand for professionally trained social workers by the 
welfare state stimulated the growth of social research and teaching in universities.67  
Initiatives such as the creation of the National College for the Training of Youth Leaders in 
Leicester, founded as a result of the Albemarle Report of 1960, also fuelled this demand.  
There was a great deal of porosity between the practitioner/policy maker and the university, 
particularly by the 1960s.  Many of those who had experience on the ground in youth and 
social work went on to do research in those fields as full-time university-based researchers, 
such as Peter Kuenstler, whilst others, like Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith, used their 
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political connections to gain traction in policy development.68 There were strong networks in 
some cases between practitioners and the universities.  Whilst these relationships were close, 
it did not follow that the academics were parochial in their reading.  Many were influenced 
by research and practice in other countries, with the US being particularly influential, largely 
because of the association of the US with the supposed root causes of delinquency - the work 
of Thrasher, Cohen, Matza and others on youth street gangs informed much work in the 
UK.69  Academics were mobile, travelling to conferences and congresses, working overseas 
and following publications from academics around the world. 
 
Researching the juvenile delinquent  
What of the field of research on children, young people and crime in this period?  The first 
three examples covered here were undertaken by university-trained social scientists working 
outside the academy at the time of the study – a point which reflects much of the porosity of 
the boundaries with the practitioner worlds.   
A.E. Morgan’s Young Citizen was relatively dismissive of juvenile delinquency as 
resulting from anything other than having a lack of anything more productive to do.  When 
indulging in the same bad behaviour, middle-class children were simply naughty; the children 
of the poor were delinquent.  Morgan favoured an economic basis to juvenile delinquency, 
pointing to the high wages enjoyed by boys during the Second World War, and appetites 
whetted by consumerism.70  The notion of relative affluence turning the working-class boy 
bad was not a new one, but it was given a fresh twist towards the end of the decade by Mark 
Abrams, author of The Teenage Consumer (1959).  Abrams, a market researcher, pointed out 
that whilst both the interwar and postwar teenager had ‘tipped up’ most of their wages, the 
postwar working-class teenager had far more to spend in real terms, and they were creating a 
‘teenage market’  around clothes, music and other consumer items, whilst their middle-class 
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counterparts were still in school.71  Peter Willmott’s Adolescent Boys of East London again 
focused on the role of this teenage consumer.  Willmott also pointed to the importance of the 
kind of work that the young men went into in terms of shaping their world view and the 
extent of their aspirations.  Willmott also fixated on the normality of thieving - and who to 
steal from - along with the importance of being able to stand one’s ground in a fight.  He also 
pointed out how few criminal families there were.72  These three studies all demonstrated a 
pre-occupation with the impact of the consumer society and consumption in the postwar 
period.  Consumption was linked with the potential for a decline in morals and cultural 
standards, anxieties about a culture marked by the unthinking consumption of ‘inferior’ 
cultural products, a theme explored famously by Richard Hoggart in The Uses of Literacy 
(1957).73   
The theme of families who had failed to benefit from the welfare state became a 
major one in the course of the 1950s and 1960s, and pre-dated the famous ‘rediscovery of 
poverty’ by Peter Townsend and Brian Abel-Smith in 1965.74  Researchers like Pearl Jephcott 
and John Barron Mays pointed to the ways in which some working class families were 
multiply deprived.  In Some Young People (1954), her study of ‘Northbury’ in East London, 
Jephcott revealed that families had an overwhelmingly local basis to their work and leisure 
lives..75 Mays came to similar conclusions in his study of Liverpool in the mid 1960s, again 
finding a localised world with limited ambitions.  Mays also pointed to a world in which 
different family norms to those of the middle classes applied,76 something also remarked upon 
earlier by Terence Morris in his 1957 work on the criminal ecology of Croydon in South 
London.  Morris painted a picture of chaotic parent(s) and families ensconced in substandard 
housing, with most of these families living in areas on which the welfare state spent least.77  
In 1966, David Downes again pointed to this world of families living in slum conditions, of 
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the importance of staying local.78   
The researchers here were not directly concerned with the impact of the welfare state 
upon these families, but rather with the backgrounds of ‘delinquent youth’.  In their various 
ways, these researchers were all looking for the causes of juvenile delinquency, and, like the 
members of the 1949 conference, turning their attentions to the home as the source of this.  
What was identified as problematic was a supposedly distinctive working class culture or 
subculture.  For Downes in particular, this suggested that youth delinquency was a subculture 
shooting off from a parent working-class culture that sat at odds with middle class norms.79  
What the researchers did not overtly consider was how the poverty these families experienced 
was not a new phenomenon, but something which had existed before the welfare state.  The 
welfare state had a limited impact upon such children, young people and their families.  It 
may have improved some of their outcomes, particularly in health terms, but it did not in 
itself create new jobs or types of work for these families, or in any other way challenge what 
was an established local culture. 
 
The Ingleby Report  
The Ingleby Report of 1958 has been seen as the last hurrah of the penal welfarist regime, as 
it would inform policy throughout the 1960s and give shape to the only partially implemented 
Children and Young Persons Act of 1969.80  The committee were set the task of looking at 
both criminal and civil matters relating to children and young people.  They looked at the 
powers of the juvenile court and its workings, the institutions for young offenders, the 
prevention of cruelty and ‘moral and physical’ danger to the young, as well as the provision 
of child care by local authorities.81  Their evidence was drawn from a wide range of 
witnesses: police, child care and social workers, the teaching profession, leaders of local 
government, medics and psychologists, the legal profession, juvenile court staff and those 
involved in probation or running the secure estate for juveniles, as well as a range of 
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charities, including the National Marriage Guidance Council, the NSPCC, the Family 
Welfare Association and the Moral Guidance Council.  A radical experiment presented 
written evidence: the Shoreditch Project, which aimed to share information and integrate 
services for needy families in East London.  A University of Birmingham study group also 
gave evidence, as did Margaret Simey, whose career straddled the boundaries of academic 
research, local government and juvenile justice.82  The committee sought out expertise as 
widely as possible, if they did not look beyond Britain for it. It did not engage with any of the 
children and young people who may have used these services directly: their voices were 
‘translated’ by the professionals who spoke for them.   
The main claim for the ‘welfarist’ agenda of the Ingleby Report was its 
recommendation for the age of criminal responsibility to be raised from eight to twelve years 
of age, essentially decriminalising the young. However, in its place would be a fairly invasive 
procedure for denoting all children under twelve who committed offences as being ‘in need 
of protection or discipline’.83  This would not be a matter of simply letting children off, but 
rather introducing more in the way of surveillance over longer periods of time – and making 
parents responsible for their children’s behaviour.  It also located responsibility for juvenile 
crime  not with cultural factors but specifically within a deviant family environment.84   
Otherwise, the Ingleby Report suggested no real changes to the system, but it would be a 
mistake to see it as being primarily concerned with a ‘cuddly’ decriminalisation of the 
criminal young.   The Committee displayed a real sympathy for the poor and the struggling, 
wanting greater powers for local government to intervene in family life.  It pointed not to a 
rehabilitative ideal with its proposal to raise the age of criminal responsibility, but rather to a 
preventative one.  This is an important distinction: rehabilitation speaks to the restoration of 
behaviour within social norms, whilst prevention is the eradication of non-normal behaviour 
in the first place.  Rehabilitation was certainly part of the Ingleby recommendations, but 
prevention pointed to a longer-term agenda of eradicating the causes of crime through 
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changing the nature of especially working-class family life.  It did not engage with the deeper 
structural issues that sociological researchers were at least beginning to identify, such as the 
localised nature of life in working class communities and its impacts on aspirations and 
behaviour, and thus with the potential of more complex causes for juvenile delinquency other 
than Western modernity.   
 
Conclusion 
A welfarist approach to juvenile delinquency was certainly evident in post-war Britain, but it 
does not follow that it was an uncontested paradigm.  Throughout the period in question, 
concerns were expressed that the system was too kind or ineffectual, that the welfare state 
and affluence were softening up or even criminalising the young: the processes of 
modernisation had caused these problems, and modern approaches were failing to deal with 
them adequately.  These concerns tied into broader issues about economic relations with 
other countries – the United States, and thus evidence of Britain’s diminished role in the 
world – as well as a sense that the Communist political system offered a moral framework 
that was increasingly lacking in the West.  Whilst those who raised these points in parliament 
or in the press were frequently checked by others, this was nonetheless a regularly occurring 
debate, a reality in itself.  The location of expertise was shifting, from an ‘amateur-expert’ 
group to academics and university- or college-trained professionals who worked within the 
framework of the welfare state and whose philosophies were part of a social ‘science 
moment’, a desire to explore modernity and its relationships with social problems. This faith 
in expertise finds resonance in Garland’s analysis, to a point.  There was less faith in penal 
welfarism as a solution, but rather as a mechanism for finding possible solutions in a world 
that appeared to be shifting dramatically to contemporaries.  Contemporaries did not see 
juvenile delinquency as being a specifically British problem, as they often saw it as being 
caused by external forces, such as Americanisation – if the expertise consulted by policy 
makers was ‘British’.  No matter how global its reach, juvenile delinquency was seen as 
ultimately having its roots within the home, and specifically within the ways that modernity 
had disrupted older traditions.  
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